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Prospects for Longer-run Productivity Growth in Japan*
Hugh Patrick
I.

Introduction
One of the remarkable features of the world economy over the

past quarter century has been the economic performance of Japan. 1
Over that period it has grown from a modest GNP with less developed
country levels of per worker output and productivity to the third
largest GNP in the world, with Western European levels of living,
output, and productivity.

In the process it has become a major par

ticipant in American 13.nd world trade, with extensive benefits fo-r all
nations.
Japan's achievement has been based on the exceptionally rapid
growth of a large country.Nationa l income grew at an annual average
rate of 8.65 percent between 1953-61, accelerating to 9.59 percent
between 1961-71

and to 9. 47 percent for 1971-73 before the most severe

postwar recession of 1974-76 engulfed Japan. 2

Over this period Japan's

population increased from 87 million to today's 112 million--almost
double that of the largest Western European nation--in a land area
about i½times that of West Germany or the United Kingdom, two-thirds
that of France, or nine-tenths that of California.

The modest growth

in population and labor force meant that labor productivity (output/
worker/year) increased at about 7 percent annually for 1953-61, 8 per
cent for 1961-71, and 8.3 percent for 1971-73.
lF

.
or a comprehensive,
detailed study see Hugh Patrick and Henry
Rosovsky, editors, Asia's New Giant--How the Japanese Economy Works
(Brookings Institution, 1976), 943 pp.
2

Data for 1953-71 are from Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung,
"Economic Growth and its Sources" in Ibid, Table 2-5, p. 84. An expanded
monograph of their study has been published as How Japan's Economy Grew
So Fast (Brookings Institution, 1976), 267 pp. Subsequent data are
for GNP based on the official statistics. During 1953~1973 GNP grew somewhat
more rapidly than national income, at a 10 percent average annual rate.

*This is.

- of a paper presented to the
a slightly revised version
Symposium on the Future of Productivity held by the National Center
for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, Washington, November
16-17, 1976.
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Several fundamental questions arise.

What were the sources of

this extremely rap:id and sustained increase in labor productivity and
output?

More important

but not unrelated: what are Japan's future

prospects for growth in labor productivity and output over the coming
10-15 years?
much?

Will future growth be less rapid?

If so, why and how

This paper examines these questions, with main emphasis upon

future prospects.

The next section presents recent comprehensive

estimates of the sources of Japan's postwar productivity performance,
as compared with Western Europe and United States.

The succeeding

section examines future prospects in terms of macro projections of
growth in output and labor productivity, and brief consideration of
related factors for economic performance.

The final section

is on

two specific themes important for future productivity performance:
government policy and government.-buoineB5 relations; and employment
practises and labor-management relations.

II.

Postwar Productivity Performance
Japan's economic success has, not surprisingly, resulted in a

number of studies, macro and micro, attempting to explain various causal
forces at work.

Two recent studies--by Denison and Chung, and by

1
Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson --provide

useful macro evidence

on the sources of increases in output and labor productivity for the
Japanese economy in comparison with other national economies.

Both

studies employ the well-known growth accounting approach, based on

1nenison and Chung, op.cit.; Laurits R. Christensen, Dianne Cummings,
and Dale W. Jorgenson, "An International Comparison of Growth in Productivity,
1947-1973," NEER Conference on New Developments in Productivity Measurement,
Nov. 13-14, 1975, mimeograph.

standard assumpti ons of competi tion in commodity and factor markets ,
no economi es of scale in product ion, the equivale nce of labor and
capital shares in income to their respecti ve margina l product ivities in
product ion, and no synergi stic interact ions among causal factors explaining output. The growth account ing approach has been subject to
criticis m: it does not take into account the tndirect but importa nt
effects of interact ions among capital , labor, technolo gy and other causa,l
variabl es; and it treats only the proxima te causes of growth, without much
explana tion of the causes of the growth of capital stock or manhour s worked.
Concept ually other methods of analysi s, such as longer-r un general equilibr ium
econome tric models of the growth process , may be superio r, but the forces
causing the growth of output and product ivity involve a complex of "myriad
economi c, social, and natural phenome na, that no credible econome tric model
h as been constrm" !teo. 111

Thus, at present these studies arc the best com-

prehens ive empiric al analyses availab le, especia lly for compara tive purpose s.
Denison and Chung adjust nationa l figures to correspo nd to U.S.
procedu res for price deflatio n of output in current prices as well as
differe ntial effects of weather , strength of aggrega te demand, and the
like. 2 The results are presente d in Appendix Table 1, which provide s
estimate s of the contribu tions of labor and capital inputs to output,
and of the effects of improved resource (mainly labor) realloc ation,
economi es of scale in growth of market size and, residual ly,advan ces
in knowled ge and other unspeci fied sources .

Appendix Table 2 provide s

a comparis on of the sources of growth in labor product ivity (output/ worker/
year) in the business sectors for Japan and the United States. It should be
noted that the Denison- Chung estimate s give conside rable attentio n to changes
1

John W. Kendrick , "Produc tivity Trends and Prospec ts," in Joint Economic
Committ ee, U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospec ts, Problem s and
Pattern s, Volume 1 - Product ivity (Septem ber, 1976), p. 12.
2

These adjustm ents, mainly for defJ_atio n procedu res, reduce Japanese
growtJ, rate negligib ly, for 1953-71 from 9 .17 percent to 8. 81 percent .

-4-

'

in labor inputs and in the reallocation of labor to more productive uses.
While Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson employ a general
approach similar to that of Denison-Chung, they differ somewhat in their
me th0 dology · Their output measure uses gross private domestic product rather
than national income; accordingly depreciation is included (which raises the
share of capital services) but the government sector is excluded. Moreover
their measures of capital inputs are more detailed, taking into explicit
account different tax treatment by type of ownership and differential effects of
inflation; on the other hand, their treatment of labor is much less
detailed, limited to measurement of skills by level of educational
attainment.

Their results appear in Appendix Table 3

for sources of total output growth and Appendix Table

4 for sources

of growth of labor productivity (output/worker /hour).

They

include directly in the labor and capital input estimates measures of
the improvement in the composition of these resources. 1
While the two studies differ somewhat in time period covered,
extent of coverag~, and methodology, a number of important conclusions
emerge, and certain similarities are striking.

In comparison with

Western Europe and the United States, both output and the combined
input of capital and labor grew substantially more rapidly in Japa..,.
The growth in aggregate labor input and contribution to output was
somewhat higher, but net so much so as to account significantly for
Japan's rapid growth.

Accordingly, Japan's growth in labor productivity

was triple that in the United States, and about 50 percent above that in
the most rapidly growing Western European nations. The increase in capital input
in Japan was much more rapid than for labor, and was 1½ times its nearest
competitor West Germany, a consequence of Japan's extremely hig,.~ shares

1

rn their study this is referred to as increases in the quality of
labor (as measured by changes in educational attainment) and the quality
of capital (as measured by changes in the composition of capital, sub
components of which have constant but different rates of capital service flows).
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of productive investment and private saving in GNP.

Moreover, the increase

in output per unit of combined capital and labor input--vari ously re
ferred to as total factor productivit y, technologic al change, or the un
explained residual--w as substantial ly higher in Japan, contributin g some

4.1 - 4.4 percentage points to total growth.

Nonetheless , because total

growth was so rapid, the contributio n of Japan's increase in total factor
productivit y was slightly lower than in Western Europe, though higher
than for the United States.
The broad similarity of--and certain differences in--the two
studies hold as well for a more detailed examination of the Japanese case
~

se.

Let us examine the Denison-Chu ng data for 1961-1971, closest

in time period to the Christensen- Cummings-J orgenson 1960-1973 coverage.
The results are given in Tah1P.s 1 and 2 for sources of Japanese growth
of output and of labor productivit y (output/manh our)

respectivel y.

The

tables reflect some reorganizat ion of the underlying categories in order
to achieve greater comparabili ty.
First, the total combined input of labor and capital in amount, changes
in composition ,and sectoral reallocatio n explains about 56-60 percent of
total output growth, and 48-49 percent of the growth in labor productivit y
(output/man hour).

I return to this point below.

Second, increases in direct labor input only explain 15-20 percent of
Japan's output growth.

Most came through the increase in employment, to

gether with some rise in total manhours worked as labor shifted
out of agriculture and as overtime remained important.

Improve-

ments in the average educational level of the labor force, while substantial ,
made a relatively small measured contribution to output and productivit y
increase.

However, it is probably true that given levels of educational

TABLE 1.

Comparison of Sources of Growth of Output
- '

(in percentage points and percent of total)

Denison-Chung
1961-71
Amount

Share of
Total

Christensen et al
1960-73
Amount

Share of
Total

Output

9.29

100

Direct labor input

1.78

19.2

1.65

15.0

Other than Education
Education
Direct capital input

1.ti-3

15.4
3.8
27.7

1.30
0.35

11.8
3.2

3.52

32.0

1.37

12.5

0.35
2.57

Change in capital composition

11.0

100

Labor sectoral reallocation

0.81

8.7

Total factor inputs,including
reallocation effects

5.16

55.5

6.6

60.0

Total factor productivity

4.13

44.5

4.4

40.0

Economies of scale

1.96

21.1

Trade barriers reduction

0.01

0.1

-0.27

-2.9

2.43

26.2

Irregular factors
Advances in knowledge,
etc. (residual)
--------- -·-··-------·-··--

Source:

·-----···-·--··---·---

Denison and Chung, How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast, Table 4-6,
p. 38; Appendix Table 3.

-7TABLE 2.

Comparison of Sources of Growth of Labor Productivity
(in percentage points and percent of total)

Denison-Chung
1961-71

Christensen et al
1960-73

Amount

Share of
Total

Output/manhour

8.02

100.0

8.9

100.0

Capital per worker

2.21

27.6

2.61

29. 3

1. 37

15.4

.33

3.7

Change in capital composition

Amount

Share of
Total

Labor education

0.35

4.4

Labor other direct changes

0.61

1.6

Labor reallocation

0.81

10.1

-0.06

-0.7

TuLal factor lnput8,
including reallocation

3.92

48.q

4.3

48.4

Total factor productivity

4.10

51.1

4.6

51.6

1.94

24.2

0.01

0.1

Lo.27

-3.4

2.42

30.2

Land

Economies of scale
Trade barriers reduction
Irregular factors
Advances in knowledge
etc (residual)

·,

Source:

Denison-chung, How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast, Table 5-1, p. 52;
Appendix Table 4.

Note:

Rounding error of 2.4 percentage points in Christensen-Cum mings
Jorgenson is attributed entirely to the residual total factor
productivity item.
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skills were better utilized as time went on; Japan has had, and to some
extent still has, excess capacity in the quality of its labor force as
denoted by education al attainmen t.
Third, the rapid growth of capital stoek in total and per worker meant that
its contribut ion has been substanti al:

28-32 percent of output and

28-29 percent of manhour productiv ity.

Since the early 1960s Japan has

been ploughing back 35-40 percent of its GNP into gross domestic investmen t.
Moreover, much of this investmen t was for business plant and equipment , with
directly productiv e implicati ons for further growth of measured GNP.

Both

the (realized ) optimism of business investmen t demand and private voluntary
saving behavior have been extraordi nary, resulting in the highest shares of
saving and investmen t in GNP of a free market economy in peacetime the world
has ever seen.
Fourth, both studies emphasize the importanc e of the reallocat ion of
labor and capital as additions to
put to more productiv e use.

the labor supply and capital stock are

Denison-C hung focus on the transfer of labor,

adjusted for sex, education , and age, on a net basis away from low productiv ity
agricultu re and self-emplo yment (includin g family workers) in small-sca le
non-agric ultural accivitie s; they find such labor reallocat ion comprised
about 9 percent of the sources of growth in output and 10 percent in
labor productiv ity.

Christense n-Cummin gs-Jorgen son focus instead on im

provemen ts in the compositi on of capital, as new additions to capital go
into highly productiv e (of GNP) uses .. Such improvem ents in capital quality
explain 13 percent of output growth and 15 percent of labor productiv ity
improvem ent.
Both studies ignore the problems which these particula r reallocat ions
of labor and capital created for welfare as distinct from growth.

Rapid

growth h;.s been concomita nt with, in a causal pattern of interacti on,
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workers pouring into burgeoning cities and their suburbs.
has meant urban crowding, coqgestion, and pollution.

Rapid urbanization

Moreover, during the

1960s the priority allocation of savings to business investment was in
creasingly at the expense of welfare, as private housing

and social over

head needs were relatively--if not absolutely--staryed and as pollution
and other external diseconomies of urban-oriented growth were not taken
care of.

A very recent study indic·ates that between 1955-1970 net national

welfare grew considerably less rapidly than GNP. 1 Interestingly, between 1970
and 1975 net national welfare grew more rapidly than earlier--at an average
annual rate of 9.0 percent--and also much more rapidly than GNP' growth
(5.2 percent).

This recent improvement was due mainly to the absolute

reduction in air pollution levels due to the very effective anti-pollution
program of the past five years, and increased leisure time (perhaps pot
all desired) together with a rising valuation given to leisure, while
private real consumption continued to hold up fairly well, growing faster
than GNP.
It is disturbing that the macro explanations of Japanese postwar economic
performance--in terms of increases in aggregate labor and capital inputs and
in their more productive allocation--leave 40 percent plus of output growth
and half of labor productivity growth unexplained.
remains substantial.

The extent of ignorance

This is important both for our understanding of the

past and for the reliability of projections into the future.
1

The estimated annual average growth rates in 1970 prices were:
1960/1955

1965/1960

1970/1965

1975/1970

NNW

4.8

6.8

7.8

9.0

GNP

8.7

9.7

11.6

5.2

Hisao Kanamori, "Economic Growth and Welfare: GNP and NNW," paper presented
to the International Economic Conference Commemorating the Centennial of the
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo: Oct. 26-28, 1976), Table 1.

Fortunately, some further explanations can be made, qualitatively
at least, of sources of Japanese growth not measured in these aggregate
estimates.

First, disaggregation of inputs and outputs will lead to

higher estimates of the contribution of labor and capital.

The two

studies considered above give evidence that disaggregation of either
capital or labor increases the degree of explanation; presumably·a'.·st udy
incorporating disaggregation of both inputs would be even more effective.
So too would be a disaggregation of output. In a recent study based on the
former's dissertation, Nishimizu and Hulten have achieved some disaggregation
both of inputs and outputs in a ten sector model.

They stress that

productive (input-output) relationships among sectors have been quite
important:

productivity change in one sector contributes to the performance

of those sectors using its products.

They estimate that, when intermediate

input relationships are taken into account, capital and labor inputs explain
between 68-75 percent of Japanese gross output growth for 1955-71. 1
Denison-Chung examine a number of other specific sources of output
growth.

They lump together several irregular factors:

changes in weather

has only a negligible impact; work time lost through strikes and other
labor disputes was so little that it had a zero negative impact on growth;
and Japan's mild recessions ("fluctuations in intensity of demand") reduced output growth by about 1/4 percent in the 1960s--and sut,tantially
more of course in 1974-76.

Quantitatively most important--"exp laining"

21 percent of output growth and 24 percent of labor productivity growth--is
1
Mieko :lishimizu and Charles R. Hulten, "The Sources of Japanese Economic
Growth: 195.5- 71", Econometric Research Program, Princeton University, Research
Memo #200, June 1976. The definitions ann methodology are similar to Christensen
et al; the general government sector and housing are excluded but government
enterprises are included. The difference in total factor productivity estimates
of 25 anrl 32 percent depend entirely on the capital stock measure used; unfortunate
ly the rn0re recent, and presumably better, capital stock series demonstrates
slower real growth, with the attendent higher share of output growth attributed
to total factor productivity.

-ll-

the estimate of economies of scale.

Denison-Chung argue that local,

regional, and national market growth provides opportunities for greater
specialization, longer product runs, larger units of production, and
increases in private consumption concentrated in products where potential
gains from economies of scale are particularly large.

Their estimation

procedures are indirect and somewhat controversial, based on assumption
rather than empirical evidence.

They find such synergistic interactions

were larger in Japan than elsewhere, due both to faster growth itself and
to the substantial changes in Japaneae consumption patterns.
An important contributer to Japanese output and productivity performance
has been technological change itself, not in. a residual sense but in terms
of advances in knowledge.

Some improvements are embodied in new machinery

and production processes (not fully caught in measures of capital).

Others

reflect improvements in human skills and understanding, as a given level of
education encompasses more knowledge, and new production technologies and
other changes provide greater opportunities for learning on the job.
The best documented source of technological change--and it

still is

not very thoroughly studied--has been Japan's extensive purchase of foreign
technology through patent and license agreements, combined with complementary
research and development by Japanese firms, and an eventual diffusion domestically
Peck and Tamura 1 s excellent study1 points out that Japan's R & D efforts
differed from those in the United States and United Kingdom by a) the
focus on commercial application and economic

pay-off, rather than basic

lMerton J. Peck with Shuji Tamura, "Technology~' in Patrick and
Rosovsky, Asia's New Giant, pp. 525-85,

-12science, space exploration, defense or other national goals; b) the high
reliance on private industry technology search and import,and R

&

D expendi

ture; and c) active government policy to encourage yet set the terms of
technology flows, especially controls over technology imports until the
late 1960s.

Japanese R

&

D efforts have focussed particularly on making

technology connnercially feasible and profitable, and on improving foreign
technology to lower production costs or produce new products.

Of course by

no means all technological innovations were foreign in source, as Japan's
pioneering role and connnanding international market position in shipbuilding-
especially of very large tankers and other bulk cargo ships--attests.

More

over, while Japanese productivity is still below the American level for the
economy as a whole,

1

in certain industries it is higher.

For example, it

appears that in producing a ton of steel Japanese mills use less capital,
less iron ore, less coal and even less labor than do American mills.

2

1

Denison-Chung find that Japanese national income per worker employed
in 1970 was only 54.8 percent of that in the United States. Of the shortfall
of 45.2 percentage points, 8.4 percentage points was due to less capital per
worker, 9.3 percent to overallocation of labor to agricultural and non
agricultural self-employment, 3.5 percentage points to their measure of
economies of scale, and 26.0 percentage points to lags in knowledge and
general efficiency. How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast, Table 11-1, pp. 96-7
and Table 0-1, p. 250.
2

Measures of output per manhour are to be treated with caution because
of differences in product mix at the aggregate level and bec.. :se of the
extensive use of subcontract labor at the plant level. The U.S. Department
of Labor estimates that in 1975, perhaps earlier, Japan surpassed the United
States and other major producers in output per manhour; see Jerome A. Mark,
"Comparative Growth in Manufacturing Productivity and Labor Costs in Selected
Industrialized Countries", prepared for the European Association of National
Productivity Centres, Workshop on Recent Progress in Productivity Measurement
and Prospects, Copenhagen, October 27, 1976, Table 11. See also Institute
for Iron and Steel Studies, Comment~ August and September 1976 for comparison
of U.S. and Japanese Steel industries; one point made is that the Japanese
shipment yield from production is substantially higher, with concomitantly
less recirculating scrap.
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At the same time, Japan's large amount of unexplained growth (total factor
productivity) can be no means be attributed predominantly to foreign
technology licenses and domestic Rand D.

The amonnts of expenditures in

volved have simply been too small to account for more than a modest share
of the increases in total output and productivity. 3
The quality of- the Japanese labor force should not be nnderestimated.
Japanese workers in the early 1950s had on average more formal education
than their European connterparts, and the level of education has increased
substantially since then.

To some extent this has served as a reservoir of

labor skills to be drawn upon as more capital and better technology
have become available.

While the Denison-Chung and Christensen et al

studies find that increases in educational attainment account for surpris
ingly

little of the rise in output and productivity, in part this may be

because wage differentials used as weights were n·arrowing over the
period.

other research (in progress) by Saxonhouse and Patrick in explain

ing Japan's postwar foreign trade performance finds that between 1955-1970
the quality of labor (reflecting real productivity) increased at an average
annual rate of 10.4 percent for secondary school graduates, 8.3 percent
for college graduates with science or engineering degrees, and 2.7 percent

3
Japanese R and D expenditures have been about 1. 3-1. 6 percent of
As Gary Saxonhouse has pointed out, most doniestic R ,5, D expenditures
G'olP.
are included in labor and capital measures in growth accounting, so do not
(formally) contribute to an explanation of total factor productivity;
licensing of foreign know-how could be so attributed but the amounts have
been miniscule relative to G~iP (less than 0. 2 percent).
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III.

Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth Prospects

The past is only an imperfect guide to the future, but short of
divine revelation it is the only guide we have.

The appraisal in the

previous section of the sources of Japan's postwar output and produc
tivity per:formance should make us beware of any direct
extrapolation
not be

into the future.

Moreover, the future will

even a sophisticated extrapolation of the kno-wn past: we do

not comprehend fully what has actually occurred historically, especially
the evolution of fundamental long-run forces, so extrapolation is based
on imperfect knowledge; and random events are bound

to

.occur domestically

' and int~rnationally which, to a greater or lesser degree, will a:ffect
Japan's future economic performance.

The longer te.rm the projection

the greater the margin of error; a wider range of possible futures are
consistent with pR.st pR.ttP-rns, A.nil th'P. pnssih1e effects of rAndom shocks
loom greater.
Accordingly, any long-run projections of Japanese labor productivity
and GNP
growth are basically informetl judgments.
j
.

.

To a considerable degree

l~:mg-run projection remains an analytical art form rather than
highly scientific in methodology and empirical content.

Japanese

planners, policymakers, and businessmen are generally well aware of the
UJ1aerte.it1ties of long-run projeetion-s.,. which may be one reason they are
l

.

willing both to prepare them and not to take them too seriously. 1

1perhaps Americans, craving certainty (or something close to it)
more, are less willing to indulge i-n- long-run projections; certainly
American policymakers in the past took Japanese projections of economic
performance more seriously than did their Japanese.col:Ul.terparts.
Cultural anthropologists may explain Japanese attitudes about uncertainty
of projections of the future by their closeness to an uncertain nature
replete with earthquakes, typhoons, and similar lfilanticipated disasters;
it wo'1ld be ~sumptuous for an ec@.omist to do so.

-15One further caveat:

the projections here are for a period of

reasonably full employment of resources, after emergence from the current
recession.

The present degree of underutilized capacity--still close to

lO percent-~somewhat contaminates the statistics on future growth, since
for several years actual growth will probably be greater than the rise in
potential growth capacity.

As discussed below, the severity of the 1974-76

recession may also have· altered somewhat Japan's longer-run growth prospects.
At the macro level, increase in labor productivity in the long run
is closely related to the rate of GNP growth.

On the whole labor

inputs are easier to project than output growth rates, since the new
entrants into the labor force between now and 1990 have all been born.
Moreover, output growth in Japan will continue to be due sub
stantially more to increases in labor productivity than to increases in
numbers of workers and total hours worked.
Given these qualifications and disclaimers, let us begin with three
increasingly specific projections and then attempt to justify them.
l.

Japan's growth rate of output and labor productivity will be substan
tially slower between "now" (post-recession) and 1990 than in the

1960s.
2.

Japan's growth rate of output and labor productivity will be consider
ably (at least 2 percentage points) more rapid than the United States,
and somewhat more rapid than that of West European nations.

3.

There is a (subjectively) very Tuigh likelihood the GNP growth rate wil
be between 5-8 percent, and probably between 6.7 percent, with growth
of labor manhour productivity 0.5-1.0 percentage point less rapid.

1

A difference in 2 percentage points means that the amount of increase
in Japan's GNP will be about one-half that of the United States. It is worth
while remembering that during Japan's superfast growth period of 1962-72 that
amount of Japan's GNP increase was also one-half of the United States. That
performance caused major transformations in Japan's economic position in the
world and in both its exports to and imports from the United States and the
rest of the world.
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These projecti ons are now supporte d by many speciaJ. ists in Japan and most
academic speciaJ. ists on the Japanese economy in the United States, includin g
me. Even the Japanese pessimi sts have come around to a 5-6 percent projecti on;
At the aggrega te level growth in labor product ivity and output is
determin ed by the interact ion of forces which increase the product ive
capabil ity of the economy and its workers (supply effects) and forces
which determin e whether or not the product ive capacity potenti al is
fully utilized (demand effects) .

Clearly in the long run interact ion

and feedback effects are very importa nt. High demand tends to generate a
larger supply- -of labor force particip ation, hours worked, savings and
capitaJ. stock.

Higher wages for labor concomi tant with increase s in labor

product ivity (or union power) encourag es substitu tion of capital for labor
and new labor-sa ving innovati ons.

And so forth.

Both supply and demand factors enter into the thrAA projecti ons
above.

While concensu s exists on the slowdown of future growth, there

is less agreeme nt concern ing the causes of that slowdow n.

The majority

view, which I share, is that while no single factor will be dominan t
each of the sources of growth will diminish over time.

Lower populati on

growth and increase d desire for leisure will slow the increase in total hours
worked.

Capital formatio n and saving

may

decline slightly as a share of GNP, though I do not believe dramati cally.
More importa nt, the aggrega te ~apital- output ratio will rise, slightly within
the
busines s sector (in part due to ongoing pollutio n control costs), and
more so because a higher proporti on will be allocate d to governm ent
investm ent--inc reasing welfare more than measure d GNP.

The opportu nities

for technol ogical borrowin g will probably diminish somewha t and costs rise
(though Peck-Tam ura argue that Japan may continue to maintain its compara tive
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advantage in the borrowing , improveme nt :and commercia l applicati on of technolog y) .
A second interpret ation is that the impact of the present recession
is so severe

it will noticeabl y reduce Japan's growth prospects for

at least a decade relative to what the trend performan ce would have been
without recession .

Capital formation foregone means a lower capital

stock than otherwise .
may have

More important , the severity of the recession

substanti al longer-ru n dampening effects on business optimism

and hence willingne ss to expand capacity through new investmen t.
recession swere mild, without actual declines, and brief.

Previou~

Japanese

businessm en may never again achieve the pinnacles of optimisti c expectati ons
that prevailed in the late 1960s:

the age of innocence is over.

of rapid growth in the past was rapid growth itself.

Equally

As Japan has dif

ficulty in returning toward a rapid growth path, the beneficia l syner
gistic effects wlll not occur to so large a degree.
A third interpret ation, particula rly prevalent among the governmen t
bureaucra cy in Japan, is that Japanese growth will be increasin gly constrained by lack of available supplies of natural resource imports in
a world increasin gly resistent to Japan's burgeonin g share of world
import markets in these materials .

(I suspect these concerns help

account for the low profile approach of governmen t policy, and the
internati onally non-threa tening, modest growth rate objective s in the new five
year pJ.an). The fall 1973 oil crisis, following the summer 1973 US soybe-a.h export
embargo, once again brought home vividly to all Japanese the great vul
nerabilit y of their economy to interrupt ions in imports of energy, industrial raw materials , and foodstuff s.
The correct lesson of the experienc e of the various shocks to which Japan's
economy has been subject since 1971 is that the country is indeed vulnerabl e but
not weak;rath er, it is fundamen tally very strong indeed. It has strong bargainin g
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power with foreign supplier s of its raw materia ls.

More importa nt, it has

the domestic economic capacity , flexibi lity, and leadersh ip to respond
relative ly quickly and effectiv ely to such problem s.

It has solved the

balance of payments problems of the quadrup ling of imported oil costs.
It has halted rampant inflatio n--at the 25-35 percent rate--wi thout causing
serious open unemplo yment.(A s with other industr ial nations the cost in terms of
GNP foregone because of underut ilizatio n of labor and capital during the
recessio n has been very high, in excess of $100 billion .)
Nonethe less, the vulnera bility remains .

For example , five-six ths of

Japan's total energy is imported ; this ratio will be at least that high in
the mid-198 0s. 1 Some argue that while natural resource supplies are
abundan t interna tionally and will continue to be into the 1980s, by 1990
the pinch will begin to be felt, especia lly in oil.

My expecta tion is that

ony such gradual tighteni ng of supplies will be met by the usual economic
respons es: rising prices; efforts to conserve ; heighten ed R & D efforts to
improve utilizat ion and to develop substitu tes; explotta tion of new, pre
viously submarg inal, supplies ; and the like.

The Japanese have indicate d

they can play that game well.· So long as they can purchase raw materia ls
they will be able to adjust.

I find it extreme ly difficu lt to envision as

a realisti c possibi lity a world environm ent in which Japan is denied physica l
access to oil or other raw materia ls for a sustaine d period of time (say more
than six months) by means of blocade or embargo . 2

While it certainl y behoove s

Japanese governm ent officia ls to worry about this possibi lity, I regard it
1

Japan Economi c Research Center, The Japanese Economy in 1985 (Tokyo:
March, 1976) p. 26. The governm ent and JERC's estimate s of nuclear power
in 1985 are overly optimis tic, even though it is projecte d that it will
comprise only 7.9 percent of energy supply in 1985.
2

Fo"'.' a discussi on of various scenario s see Hugh Patrick , "Japanes e
Growth in Alterna tive 1980 World Economic Environ ments," in Lewis Austin,
ed. Japan: the Paradox of Progress (New Haven: Yale Univers ity Press, 1976)
pp. 89-140.
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The more serious retarding factor on growth has been the

worsening in Japan's terms of trade; due to large imports of high-priced
oil, Japan now must export 40..percent more goods to import the same amount.
The terms of trade may worsen even further in the shorter run as Japan must
generate exports to pay for a substantially larger import bill at full
employment, and in the longer run if the relative prices of raw materials
rise further.

Thus, in various respects, Japan's vulnerability is at the

center of its interdependence with the rest of the world, and it can be
expected that Japanese policymakers will continue to pay great attention to
relations with other nations and to the international economic system itself. 1
Given all these negative or retarding forces at work, how can one
project Japanese growth as more rapid than the best West European performance? In general one can be optimistic or pessimistic about the future.
I see no substantial reasons to be more pessimistic about Japan's prospects
over the next fifteen years than those of other countries.

Everyone has

problems: the question is how one responds to them.
Fundamentally, I expect the Japanese to respond rather well. The society
has demonstrated a strong capacity and will to overcome problems and a
high priority to economic objectives.

Despite temporary problems economically

and politically, these traits will persist.

Work and performapce values

permeate the society and will erode only slowly.

Japanese are intelligent, dili

gent, and hard workers; they want to see a task well done.

They are

ambitious and eager to improve their material welfare. Alienation from the work
place is relatively low, and management makes a conscious effort to keep its
workers loyal, relatively happy, and locked into the firm. This is not to deny that
1For a discussion in terms of American interests and potential promlem
:areas in future economic relations with Japan, see Gary Saxonhouse and Hugh
Patrick, "Japan and the United States: Bilateral Tensions and Multilateral
Issues in the Economic Relationship" in Donald C. Hellman, ed. China and
Japan: A New Balance of Power (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1976), pp. 95-157 •
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larger organizat ions, private and governmen t, are often petty, bureaucr atic,
and not always quick to respond~ -especiall y to what might be termed software
changing condition s in distinctio n to hardware technolog ical changes.
The complex Japanese webs of personal relations and obligatio ns have strengths
and weaknesse s. (One weakness is that they are difficult and slow to change
when they become inefficie nt, as exemplifi ed by the Japanese distribut ion
system). Japan will continue to be a high saving-hi gh investing society,
so capital stock will continue to grow more rapidly than elsewhere .

The

remaining productiv ity different ial, together with R&D-based innovatio ns
internati onally and domestic ally, offer further opportun ities for advances
in knowledge .

Japanese firms, including the large trading companies , seem

to have developed an excellent internati onal search and importati on process
for new technolog ies; although not well studied yet, it apparentl y is consider
ably more comprehe nsive, systemati c, and effective than the methods used
by American and European firms.
While there are no recent, comprehen sive projectio ns of Japan's
economic performan ce to 1990, two projectio ns to 1985 are available .
Foreseein gno particula r discontin uities in the mid-1980s I anticipat e the
growth rate at the end of the decade will be only moderatel y slower, if
at all, than at the beginning .

Starting in fall 1974 the advisory

Industria l Structure Council of MITI (the Ministry of Internati onal Trade
and Industry) has issued what is intended to be an annually rolling t~n
year projectio n, appropria tely subtitled "A Long Range Vision. ,,l

It is

a statement of national economic goals and how they can be achieved.

The

differenc e in long-run projectio ns of the first two reports is small, and
the latter is used here.

Also,

the private Japan Economic Research Center

(JERC) prepares a series of annual,fi ve-year and ten-year projectio ns on
1
The first two are available in English summary as Japan's Industria l
Structure --A Long Range Vision (Tokyo: Japan External Trade Organizat ion,
June 197>) and Japan's Industria l Structure --A Long Range Vision 1975
Edition (Tokyo: MITI Backgroun d Informati on BI-17, February 1976). The 1974
report suggests a mild slowdown in growth to 6.0 percent for 1985-90, but
the 1975 report suggests a continuat ion at 6.5 percent for 1986, and does
not project beyond that.
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an on-going basis.
1985. 1

In spring 1976 it released a new projection to

These projections are summarized in Table 3.

The two projections are broadly similar in methodology and in results.
JERC expects slightly faster growth of output (7.0 percent versus MITI's

6.5 percent~ slightly slower labor productivity growth (6.7 percent per
manhour versus 6.9 percent), less of a decline in the work.week, slower in
crease in consumption expenditures, more rapid inflation, and higher
rates of business and government fixed investment.
simple:

The methodology is

the growth rate of output (and perhaps even of labor productivity)

is assumed

(based on informed and sophisticated judgment), then the implied

consistent sequence of final demand, intermediate demand, capital and labor
inputs, and (implicitly) total factor productivity is derived, and the results
presumably examined to be sure they are plausible and reasonable.
Both projections on labor inputs start from the same demographic facts
of slower labor force growth and higher average age.

Participation rates

will decrease slightly overall, somewhat more for young (remaining longer
in school) and old (more old people and a higher proportion retired), and
increase modestly for married women age 35-64 re-entering the labor force.
Both projections assume that labor productivity, while increasing slower
than before, will continue to rise rather rapidly--so much so that demand
for labor relative to supply may be somewhat slack.

In effect increasing

labor shortage is assumed away; rather both are concerned--unduly
the employment system is quite flexible--about rising unemployment.

since
While

MITI visualizes the labor adjustment mainly in a substantially shorter

1

Japan Economic Research Center, The Japanese Economy in 1985 (Tokyo:
March 1976).
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Table 3.

Japan Econontl.c Research Center and Ministry of Internati onal Trade and
Industry Projectio ns of Growth Rates of Japanese Economic Performan ce
JERC, 1975-85
Real
Current Price

MITI, 1980-85
Real

Current Price

GNP
Primary
Secondary
(Manu:fac turing)
Tertiary

7.0
1.3
7.6
7.6
7.0

13.0
9.0
12.3
11.8
14.5

6.5
2.3
6.6a
6.3a
6.oa

10.5

Personal Consumpti on Expenditu re

6.2

12.5

6.8

10.9

GNP de:flator
CPI

5.6
6.o
4.0
12.0

WPI
Land Price
Labor Force Populatio n
Employment
Primary
Secondary
(Manu:fac turing)
Tertiary
Hours per worker
Output/w orker/yea r
Output/wo rker/manh our

0~8
0.9
-4.9
1.2
1.1
1.7
-0.6
6.0
6.7

0.7a

-3.Ba
l.la
0.9a
1.5a
!:L
-1.1
b
5.2a(5.8b )
6.3a(6.9 )

Business Fixed Investmen t
Private Capital Stock
Housing Construct ion
Governmen t Fixed Investmen t
Compensa tion per employee
Corporate pro:fits (before taxes)

3.7
4.5
2.5

5.2
6.7
7.4
10.0
14.4

Note: Since 1975 was a recession year and 1985 is assumed to be a year of full
employme nt o:f resources , growth rates are slightly different from those of
a full employment base year.
Source:

Japan Economic Research Center, The Japanese Economy in 1985 (March
1976), various tables; Ministry of Internati onal Trade and Industry,
Japan's Industria l Structure --A Long Range Vision, 1975 Edition (MITI
BI-17, February 1976), various tables.

aFor 1970-1985 during which the projected GNP growth rate is 5.9 percent.
b

For 1980-85, assuming 1970-85 rates of employment growth and hours per worker
decrease arply.
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work week (36.5 hours), JERC perceives it mainly in the degree of utiliza
tion (and presumably terms of work) of older and female workers.

The

marginal suppliers of labor will continue to be treated marginally.
A related concern is whether the economy can absorb in fully productive
jobs

the ever burgeoning numbers of college graduates.

It is suggested

in the 1975 MITI report that in the mid-1980s about 50 percent of the age
cohort will enter universitie s or junior colleges.

This poses potential

problems for the handling of managerial personnel; the bulge in lower to
middle management numbers means that future promotion prospects look less
good than in the past.

At the other end of the spectrum large numbers of

workers, especially females, remain in low productivit y jobs throughout the
economy.

All in all, it is difficult to think of shortages of labor--in

amount and in educational and skill levels--as being a serious constraint
on future growth.
We can do better than simply assuming a growth rate of 6.5 or 7 percent,
projecting labor force participatio n, and deriving labor productivit y
estimates.

The primary long-run focus properly is on the increase in pro

ductivity capacity of the economy, the sources of growth as discussed in
the previous section.

In Table 4 the JERC projections on employment, hours

worked per worker, and growth of the capital stock are combined with the
Christensen- Cummings-J orgenson estimates of relative shares to labor and
capital, the (invariant) share of total factor productivit y, and different
assumptions concerning the degree of benefit from reallocatio n of capital
and labor. This provides a t_est for consistency between the demand and supply sides.
The results in Table 4 can be interpreted various ways.

Broadly,

growth of output and labor productivit y is consistent with the JERC-MITI
projections , as long as a substantial benefit from reallocatio n and
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4.

Illustrat ive Projectio ns of Growth Rates of Japan's Gross
Private Domestic Product, l975-1985 , Based on Alternati ve
Assumptio ns for Improveme nts in Labor and Capital Compos
ition (in percent)
Input Composit ional Effect
One-half
1960-73
l960-73
Hl
R~e
R~e

Labor Input
a
Employmen
,_ t
a
Manhours ·per worker
Composi•t•ion C

0.3
0.9
-0.6

0.9
0.9
-0.6

o.6
0.9

-o.6

0

o.6

Capital
Input
.
a
Amount
Composlti onc

6.9
6.9

9.9
6.9

0

3,3

Average Share to
Laborb b
Capital

60

60

40

60
40

Total Capital and Labor Input

2.94

4.50

3,76

Total Factor Productiv ityd

l.96

3.00

Output (Gross Private
Domestic Product)

4.9

7.5

6.3

Output/w orker/yea r

4.o

6.6

5,4

Output/wo rker/manh our

4.6

40

0.3

6.o

Notes:
813ased on Japan Economic Research Center, The Japanese Economy in 1985
(see Table 3).
bApproxim ate estimate consisten t with Japanese and internati onal data
reported in Christens en, Cummings and Jorgenson (see Appendix Table 3).
cAssumed, based on data in Christens en, Cummings and Jorgenson (seeAppen dix
Table 3);
d

Assumed to be 2/3 of contribut ion of total capital and labor input
(ho% of total output), based on data in Christens en, CUijunings and
Jorgenson (see Appendix Table 3).
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improvement of labor and capital persists.
labor force.

That seems likely for the

It seems considerably less likely for the private capital

stock, since higher proportions will go into housing, pollution control
and the like.

The assumption that total factor productivity will cause

a constant proportion (40 percent) of output growth is rather rigid; it
implies that growth is proportionally augmenting of direct factor inputs.
One might make alternative plausible assumptions for total factor pro
ductivity growth:

at a constant annual rate (2-3 percent); at some ratio

of past total factor productivity growth (1/2, 2/3); at some rate increasing
more than proportionately as the rate of output growth increases.

It is

a confession of our ignorance that such a wide range of assumptions are
plausible.
Denison and Chung go through an interesting exercise in seeking to
answer the question of the degree to which Japan's 1961-71 growth rate of
national income is sustainable to the end of this century.

They argue that

almost two-thirds of Japan's postwar growth was due to the elimination of
backlogs of inefficiency, the technology gap, and related features of
being a latecomer

to economic development.

As the economy continues to

grow, these transitional contributions are used up and growth will slow down
to an eventual "mature" rate of 3 1/4 percent. 1
are reproduced in Table 5.

The Denison-Chung estimates

Based on an assumed pattern of phasing out

of these transitional elements the implied growth rate is 6.4 percent for
output and 5.9 percent for labor manhour productivity for 1977-82 (excluding
any effects of the current recession), and 5.7 percent for output and 5.2
percent for labor manhour productivity for 1982-90.
1
151.

The authors are careful

Denison and Chung in Patrick and Rosovsky, Asia's New Giant, pp. 139-
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Table 5-

Denison and Chung Estimates of Sustainable
and Transitional Contributions to the Standard
ized Growth Rate of National Income~ 1961-71,
a.~d Year Transitional Contribution Expires

Total

Sustainable

Tra11sirio11al

rear
tra11sirioi,a/
co11:rih11io11
expires"

Rate or source

(/)

(2)

(J)

(4)

Standardized growth ra!e

9.56

3.24

6.32

Labor
Employment
Hours
Age-sex composition
Education
Unallocated

1. 78
1.09
0.11
0.19
0.35
0.04

0.68
0.33
-0.15
0.11
0.35
0.04

0.76
0.26
0.08
0.00
0.00

capital
Inventories .
Nonresidential structures
and equipment
Dwellings
International assets

2.51
0.86

0.86
0.21

0.65

1976

1.44
0.27
0.00

0.38
0.27
0~00

1.06

1976

0.00
0.00

Land

0.00

0.00

0.00

Advances in knowledge
and n.e.c.b

2.43

1.28

1.15

2002

Contraction of a~icultural
inputs

0.62

0.00

0.62

1982

Co11tributio11 in pacel'/uge pou:rs.
/9{;]-7/

· Contraction of nonai;ricultural
self-employment

1.10

1973
1974
1977

1. 71

0.19

0.00

0. 19

1990

Reduction in international
trade barriers

0.01

0.00

0.01

2002

F.conomies of scale
Measured in U.S. prices
Income elasticities

1. 14
0.82

0.42
0.00

0.72
0.82

1995

Source:

Denison and Chung in Patrick and Rosovsky, Asia's New Giant,
Table 2-19, p. 140.

a. Assumes contribction continues a! 1961-il size until expiration.
b. Not c!s~Y:herc classiti~,L
c. The distri:,~:ion amo11~ i~ars folk,"s: 1973, 0.10 points; 1974, 0.03; 197f. 0.22; 191'1,
1931, 0.08; 1990, 0.0.:?; 1995, O.il; ~002. 0.15.

\J.l,; ·

'
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to state this is not an)actual projection but does represent a means of
bringing past experience to bear upon judgments about the future.

I re

gard these estimates as somewhat conservative, notably the assumed sus
tainable rates of growth of investment and capital stock of 3 1/3 percent
and technological progress (advances in knowledge) of 1 1/4 percent.
Both these estimates of potential output and labor productivity growth from
the supply side are on the order of 1 percentage point lower than the MITI1
JERC projections. Since my intuitive judgment is that a relatively higher
growth rate (in the 7 percent area) is possible, it is tempting to stress
the high degree of uncertainty inherent in the supply potential projections.
Nonetheless, these relatively conservative estimates do suggest a growth
rate in the 1980s on the order of 6 percent for output and 5.5 percent
for labor productivity--still very good by most standards.
IV.

The Government-Business-Labor Environment for Growth
These projections of macro economic performance provide useful guides

to judg

the future prospects for Japanese productivity.

However, they

should be regarded as the skeleton upon which the real world flesh of the
institutional environment and of public and private policy must be draped.
It is a mistake to take these as given, unalterable over time.

Due to space

limitations, I concentrate this all-too-brief discussion on two themes:
government policy and government-business relations; and emplv/ment practices
and labor-management relations.
I am of the school which interprets Japanese economic performance as due pri
marily to the actions and efforts of private individuals arid enterprises
responding to the opportunities provided
commodities and labor.

in quite free markets for

While the government has been supportive and indeed

indeed hs done much to create the environment for gr©wth, its role has
1

Projections based on the Nishimizu-Hulten results are even lower since
their total factor productivity component is smaller, even though they ob
tained a slightly higher (45 percent) capital share.
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often been exaggerated. 1

Rapid growth in the past has meant that almost all

have benefitted--wor kers, managers, stockholders, government officials,
consumers--and almost

all economic policies have looked good.

MITI

has been quick to claim credit for virtually all industrial development,
but with some justice only for a limited.number of industries.
The current domestic political difficulties and the fast growth
slow growth debate signal that the mere extension of the past role of the
government cannot be taken for granted.

The present fight over political

power in the Liberal-Democr atic Party (LDP) and control of the government
has resulted in inattention to aggregate demand management and prolonged
slowness in emergence from the depths of recession.

Fundamentally it

also reflects the long-run erosion of LDP support at the polls.

And,

since the rise in concern over pollution, environmental disruption generally,
the oil embargo, and heightened inflation, there has arisen a group arguing
for slow growth(the rate undefined but perhaps 4-5 percent) as desirable
to reduce the creation of problems and associated social tensions.
I predict that either the LDP will remain in power or a centrist coalition
will be formed and that under either the main thrust of economic policy,
domestically and internationally , will not be substantially altered.

The

government's share in GNP will rise, but slowly, to meet needs for social
infrastructure investment and transfer payments for health, retirement,
and other welfare purposes.

High priority will continue to be given to

economic goals, with emphasis shifting somewhat to quality of life objectives
1

There is by now a fairly substantial literature on this issue.
See Philip H. Trezise with Yukio Suzuki, "Politics, Government, and
Economic Growth in Japan" and Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's
Economic Performance: An Overview" in Patrick and Rosovsky, Asia's
New Giant. For a more positive view see William V. Rapp, "Japan's Industrial
Policy" in Isaiah Frank, ed. The Japanese Economy in International Perspective
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

-29,...

rather than economic growth per se. The rapid growth propone nts--whi ch
include MITI and the Japan Economic Research Center- -will emerge the
winners (though this is more an America n than a Japanese charact erizatio n,
since it will be termed. a new concens us).

The justific ation will be

that only growth can provide the resource s for improvin g the quality of
life

and

provide a higher share of governm ent revenues in GNP without

raising tax rates.

Moreove r, once fairly rapid growth is again underway politici ans

will be loathe to slow it down

for

Thus, I anticipa te that the long-run

preconce ived lower targets.
likeliho od

managem ent or adoption of slow growth objectiv es

of inadequ ate demand
is low, so that the

economy will be able to achieve fairly close to its potenti al.
While the governm ent does engage in planning of a sort and issue
five-yea r plans, the effectiv e role of planning is rather modest. 1

Perhaps

its most importa nt funct:Lon is to provide a mechanis m for thinking in
longer-r un terms about the economy 's goals, prospec ts, and problem s, and
hence for providin g informa tion and signals for public and private decision 
making.

Its other importan t function is to formulat e governm ent investm ent

program s on a longer run basis; unlike the rest of the plan, which is
highly aggrega tive, indicati ve, and not really impleme nted, governm ent
investm ent

projects

and are done.

embodied in the plan do enter the budgeta ry process

MIT!' s Long Range Vision describe s and justifie s pla11ning as

follows:
In order to realize an industr ial structur e capable
of satisfyi ng the diverse needs of the people ••.
it will be necessar y to complem ent the market
mechanis m by introduc ing "soft planning ", estab
lishing guidelin es, elements and relevan t measure s.
Importa nt for the introdu ction of such planning is
a securing of broad consensu s among those concerned and in turn, the concensu s of the people. 2
1

see Ryutaro Komiya, "Plannin g in Japan," in Morris Bornste in, ed. Economic
Plannin g. East and West (Balling er, 1975); Tsunehik o Watanab e, "Nation al Planning
and Economi c Developm ent--A Critica l View of the Japanese Experie nce," Economi
cs
of Plannin g Vol. 10, #1-2 (1970).
2
MITI, J apan ' s Id
n ustrial Structur e--A Long Range Vision, 1975 Edition , p. 11.
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Government involvement in the activities of big business, especially
in so-called key industries, is active, extensive, routine, and more or
It is much less clear how effective it is, and

less taken for granted.
by what criteria.
to business.

Often intervention is in support of policies favorable

This was particularly true when the government bureaucrats·;

the LDP politicians in power, and big business leaders agreed that the
main goal of economic policy was rapid growth.

Although business I heyday of power probably peaked in the late 1960s Japan
nonetheless remains very much a big business society, like Western Europe
and the United States.

The earlier concensus eroded as pollution control

and other q.uality of life issues came to the fore in recent years.

However,

pollution control is being achieved remarkably rapidly and inexpensively
in Japan--at least compared to the earlier fears of business.

It seems

likely that a new concensus will emerge focussed on the slogan of the
quality of life, with the understanding that private sector-based rapid
growth will be essential.

Thus far organized labor has not been an important>

accepted participant in the government-business relationship in formal
policymaking at the national level.

Coalition government enhances the

prospects that it may be incorporated somewhat, at least ceremonially.
Nonetheless, in fact labor is already an important participant in setting
national guidelines for the annual wage package through its annual spring
offensive.
Descriptions (and stereotypes) of Japanese labor-management relations
abound.
1

1

Most discussion focuses on large organizations--large private

useful studies include Walter Galenson with
Konosuke Odaka, "The Japanese Labor Market 11 in Patrick and Rosovsky Asia's
New Giar~; Kazuo Okochi, Bernard Karsh, and Solomon B. Levine eds. Workers
and Employers in Japan: The Japanese Employment Relations System (Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1973); and Robert M. Marsh and Hiroshi Mannari,
Modernization and the Japanese Facto!',L_(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976).
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firms, government enterprises such as the Japan National Railroad, and
the government bureaucracy itself--where in the ideal model employees
are hired only when they first enter the labor force after school, they
are kept on until retirement at 55 or so, they are never laid off, wages
increase through seniority·until retirement, and production and clerical
workers belong to a union organized and negotiating at the company level
rather than industry-wide.

The real-world ad3ustments of this model give

employers considerably more flexibility in adjusting labor inputs and
costs than the model's rigidity would suggest.

Moreover, the permanent

employment system and union membership cover somewhat less than one-third
of the total labor force.

And even within large organizations, it applies

more to the educated managerial track than to clerical or production workers.
Nonetheless the labor-management relationship is rather more
symbiotic than in the United States.

Each is more clearly locked into the

other in Japan, and each is more aware of it.

Reward to labor comes pre

dominately through increasing the size of the pie.
productive benefits:

The system has certain

it is worthwhile for management to train and retrain

such· permanent workers, labor benefits from technological innovations since
jobs are secure; and workers identify their own welfare directly with the
performance of the company so work stoppages are minimized.
has disadvantages for labor:

The system also

bargaining power over labor's share in the total

pie is weakened; it is difficult for labor and management to collude at the
industry level to reach wage bargains whereby the costs are passed on to con
sumers through higher prices; and lack of good alternative job opportunities
reduces the freedom of mobility of individual workers, and means they may have
to put up with less attractive work environments than if they were not so
immobile.

On net balance, most observers seem to feel that this system
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and labor productivity, and consequently that the incomes and level of
living are higher for Japanese workers than otherwise would have been the case.
Management takes great pains to perpetuate the structure of this system,
while all sorts of wage differentials within the firm have narrowed in
response to changing labor market conditions.

Management stresses an

ideology of harmony, cooperation, loyalty, performance, and identification
of employee with the company. 1

It rewards all workers so long as output and

productivity are rising rapidly with substantial wage increases, a wide range
of fringe benefits, and large semi-annual wage bonuses.

(Bonuses are so in

stitutionalized that a major portion is simply regarded as part of the regular
wage).

This emphasis on concensus and harmony, while important in itself,

also covers over a great deal of competitivenes s, and mutes the inherent
adversary relationship between labor and management and indeed the whole
range of conflicts of interest that exist in any economy.

It is also a

means of de-emphasizing victory and assuring the help of those who lost.
This managerial style is reflected also in the internal decision-making
process throughout all levels of management.

Japanese management is highly

people oriented and communications and coordination oriented, especially
laterally at all levels within the organization.

Great emphasis is pl~ced

on initiative and flow of ideas from the bottom up.

The Japanese managerial

system is well described in a study sponsored by the National Center for

1

This management strategy is highly rational, especially since it reflects
basic Japanese values symbolized by such key terms as concensus, group orientation,
cooperation, harmony, negotiated compromise, loyalty, performance, thorough prepara
tion, and merit. A list of such key terms for the United States includes individual
ism, self-interest, initiative, spontaneity, responsibility, competition, winning,
and litigated resolution as well as performance and merit. While the United States
and Japan occupy quite different places on a complex cultural spectrum--with
Western European countries on average somewhere in between--these symbolic terms
reflect extremes or ideal-types that are stereotypic rather than accurate reflec
tions of reality. For example, strong tendencies exist in American society for
cooperative efforts (pulling together as a team), mechanisms for muting conflict,
and search for a middle ground (concensus by compromise). And ahigh degree of
competitivenes s is a major, if socially somewhat muted, feature of Japanese
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Are Japanese industrial relations, decision-making processes, and
managerial styles exportable?
foreign direct investment?

Can Japanese apply them well to their own

Does it make sense for Americans and others

to adopt all or some of these practices?

While we do not know, since the

number of cases are relatively few and careful study of them far fewer,
available evidence suggests that American production workers respond posi
tively to the personal interest manifested in Japanese supervisory style,
but that lower and middle American managers in Japanese firms have trouble
responding to the (often implicit) signals and modes of behavior of the
Japanese managerial system.
More important for the purposes here, to what extent will the Japanese
permanent employment system persist in the future?
labor-management relations?

What are the prospects for

A few years ago--before the current recession--I

was concerned about a serious intensification of labor strife as the real
growth rate of. output and labor productivity slowed down yet labor would be
unwilling to accept a slowdown in hitherto annual wage increases of 12-15
percent, while consumers and the government would be unwilling to accept the
higher rates of inflation implied by such wage settlements if they did occur.
I thus foresaw a difficult transition process.
I no longer feel so concerned this will occur.

One of the few benefi

cial effects of the current recession is that it brought about this transition,
and painlessly so in terms of labor-management strife.

The recession has

proven for most large firms to be the first real testing of their permanent
employment commitment.

When close to bankruptcy a Japanese firm like any

other ruthlessly fires workers in order to stay alive.

Short of th?t the

society--~mong individuals (by year of entry) in business firms and government
bureaucrccies, and among competing factions prevalent in virtually all kinds
of large organizations.
1 Richard
Tanner Johnson and William G. Ouchi, "Made in America (under
Japanese Management)," Harvard Business Review, Sept.-Oct. 1974, pp. 61-69.
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for how long and to what extent are large firms prepared to

keep workers on the payroll when output demand is so slack that their labor
cannot be utilized?

The answer is:

for a long time (up to two years) and

to a considerabl e extent (perhaps 10-15 percent of the firm's work force),
and with serious deterioratio n of profits, and even losses. 1

In other words,

while there have been various a~justments (early retirement, sending workers
home while still receiving base pay, and the like) basically the co!Illl1itment
has been maintained.

But at a price to labor as well.

In its bargaining

over wage settlements in spring 1975 and 1976 management made it clear that
if substantial wage increases-- or indeed any increases in real terms (after
adjusting for inflation)-- were negotiated it would have to be at the expense
of firing workers, i.e., the effective ending of the permanent employment
commitment.

Labor union leaders, as in other countries during this recession,

thereupon decided that job securi.ty for all regular employees (namely union
members) was of higher priority than wage increases in such periods of adversity,
and accepted very moderate raises.

Moreover, actual wage settlements by industry

and firm were spread over a far wider range than previously, reflecting business
ability to pay and labor willingness to compromise to keep the enterprise going
and their jobs secure.

Moreover, labor is probably prepared to settle for wage

increases in the future consonant with productivit y and cost of living increases.
I thus feel fairly sanguine about the overall prospects for labor
management relations.

Slower labor force growth and some continued

tightening of labor markets will mean some increases in turnover, decline
1

It should be stressed that this is not irrational behavior by large
firms; it simply reflects the nature of institution al arrangement s in Japan,
including the explicit and implicit terms of the contract with labor. In
effect the unemploymen t compensatio n system has been privatized in Japan,
and firms are not subject to payroll taxes to finance unemploymen t l'unds.
One reason profit performance has been so bad in the recent recession is
that firms had not funded such contingent liabilities through reserv~
accounts
Prior to the 1974~76 recession Japanese firms were ahead
of the game since previous recessions were so mild that labor was never
seriously underutiliz ed. In the future there probably will be an expansion
of government funding of situations where workers remain on the payroll but
their services are not used.
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in employee identification with employer, and continued modification
of the seniority basis of wages.

1

Management will seek ways to be able

to reduce the fixed component of labor inputs.

Nonetheless, the permanent

employment system will remain pretty much in force.
It may be well to end on the same note of caution with which this
paper began.

Projection, muchless prediction, is hazardous since the

range of error is large and increases with the time span being considered.
Thus, while the projections of output

and labor productivity growth

are plausible, they represent little more than "best guesstimates. 11
On the other hand, for those concerned with Japan's involvement with the
rest of the world, especially their own world, it probably is
wiser to overestimate Japan's expected future economic performance than
to underestimate it.

1

For an interesting discussion see Robert E. Cole, "Changing Labor
Force Characteristics and Their Impact on Japanese Industrial Relations, 11
in Lewis Austin, ed. Japan: The Paradox of Progress.

Ap~endix

Table 1.

Denison-Chung Estimates of Sources of Growth of Standardized Growth Rate of
National Income, Whole Economy, by Country, Various Periods, 1948-71
(Percentage points)

Item

Japan,
1953-71

United
West
Italy,
States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
1948-69 1950-67• 195o-62 1950-62 195o-62 195o-62 1950-62

Standardized growth rate

8.81

4.00

4.95

Total factor input

3.95

2.09°

3.02

1.17

Labor contribution
Employment
Hours of work
Age-sex composition
Education
Unallocated

1.85
1.14
0.21
0.14
0.34
0.02

1.30

1.85
1. 82
-0.20

0. 76

Capital contribution
Inventories
Nonresidential structures
and equipment
Dwellings
International assets

2.10
0.73

0. 79°
o. 12

1.07
0.30
0.00

0.28b
0.03

Land

0.00

Output. per unit of input,
standardized

Advances in knowledge and
n.e.c.<

1.17
-0.21
-0.10
0.41
0.03

-0.13
0.36

0.00
1.14
0. 10

3.03

0.40
-0.15
0.08

3.63

6.27

1.55

1.24

2.78

1.66

1.91

1.04

1.11

0.59
0.70

0.45
0.08
-0.02
0.10

1.37
1.49
-0.27
0.04

0.96

0.87

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.78
-0.16
0.01
0.24
0.00

0.60
0.50

0.29

0.42
0.05
0.09
0.40
0.00

0.15
0.13
-0.15
-0.07
0.24
0.00

1.41

0.70

0.33

0.12

1.04
0.22

0.89
0.13

1.02

0.54
0.07
-0.03

0.66
0.06·
0.10

0.79

0.43

0.04

. 0.04

-0.07

-0.05

0.43
0.00

-0.07
0.14
0.00

0.41
0.06

0.96
0.15

0.79
0.19

0.39

0.66
0.13

0.02

0.56
0.02
0.02

4.07

3.43

4.70

-0.18

5.60

NetherUnited
lands, Norway, Kingdom,
1950-62 J95o-62 195o-62

2.38

-0. 15
-0.04

0.29
0.00

0.51
0.09

0.87
0.30
-0.12

-o.oo

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

4.86

l.9Ih

1.96

1.86

2.08

3.46

3.49

3,94

2.16

2.39

1.27

1.97

I. 19

0.66

0.84

0. 75d

1.51

0.87d

1. 30d

0. 75d

0.90

0.79

0.95

0.30

0.64

0.51

0.68

0.95

1.01

1.42

0.63

0.92

0.12

0.64

0.23

0.54

0.20

0.41

0.65

0.77

1.04

0.21

0.54

0.06

0. 30

0.07

0.10

0.15

0.18

0.23

0.14

0.22

0.26

0.23

0.04

0.01

0.00

0.00

0. 16

0.09

0.07

0.10

0.16

0. 16

0.15

0.02

1.94
1.06
0.88

0.42
0.42

0.66
0.63
0.03

0.51
0.40

0.65
0.42
0.23

1.00
0.51

1.61
0.70

1.22
0.62

0.78
0.55

0.57

0.36

0.45

0.49

0.91

0.27

0.60

0.23

0.12

0.09

0.36

0.02

0.14
-0.08

I

,

Improved resource allocation
Contraction of agricultural
input.5
Contraction of nonagricultural
self-employment
Rcd1Jction of international
lradc barriers
Economies of scale
Measured in U.S. ·,rices
Income dasticitie~

l,J

o. 11

Source: Edward "fi'. Denison and William K. Chung, "Economic Growth and its Sources"
in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, ed. Asia's New Giant - How the Japanese
Economy Works (Brookings Institution, 1976), Table 2-13, pp. 98-99,
a. D~lails may not add to lot:ils because of rounding.
b The -0.01 percentage point contribution of the "dwellings occupancy ratio" is included in the contribution of "dwellings" for comparability with other
countries.
c. Not elsewhere classified.
d. Estimate for 1955-62 pl!riod.
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Appendix

Table 2.

Denison-C hung Condensed Classific ation of
Sources of Growth of National Income per
Person Employed, Nonresid ential Business,
Japan, 1953-71, and the United States, 1948-69

Percentage points

Output measure or source ofgrowth

National income per person employed
(U.S. deflation procedures)

Japan,
1953-71

United
States,
1948-69

Difference

Percent of
standardized
growth rate

Japan,
1953-71

United
S!tites,
1948---09

8.45

2.65

5.80

-0.05

-0.18

0.13

Standardized national income per
person employed

8.50

2.83

5.67

100.0

100.0

Advances in knowledge and
miscellaneous determinants

2.37

1.44

0.93

27.9

50.9

Economies of scale

2.35

0.51

1.84

27.6

18.0

More capital per worker

1.85

0.40

1.45

21.8

14.1

Less labor misallocated to agriculture
and nonagricultural self-employment

0.78

13.4

12.7

Irregular factors

1.14

0.36

Changes in workine hours and characteristics of labor except education

0.44

-0.34

0.78

5.2

-12.0

Increased education per worker

0.41

0.50

-0.09

4.8

17.7

Reduced international trade barriers
Less land per worker

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.1

0.0

-0.07

-0.04

-0.03

-0.8

-1.4

Source: Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung, How
Japan's Economy Grew So Fast (Brooking s
Instituti on, 1976), Table 5-3, p. 54.
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·.ran.Le

Gnris-ce nsen, GUillillings and Jorgenso n .l:!;stimates of Average Annual Rates of Growth
of Input, Output,
and Total Factor Product ivity; Average Shares of Labor and Property Compens ation
(in percent)

1960-1.973

Italy

Korea

Netherlands

United
Kingdom

United
States

-0.8

1.2

5.0

0.3

o.o

2.5

o.o

-0.9

-1.l

3.8

-0.2

-o.6

1.7

0.0

o.4

0.1

2.3

1.2

0.5

o.6

o.8

58. 6

55.3

58.4

59.9

61.7

63.1

55.5

62.7

59.2

11.8

4.5

6.2

7.1

5.4

7.3

5.8

4.o

4.1

Amount

8.5

3.9

5.4

6.6

5.0

5.9

4.5

3.3

2.9

Improvem ent in Compos itiona

3.3

o.6

o.8

0.5

o.4

]! • 4

1.3

0.7

1.2

41.4

44.7

41.6

40.1

38.3

36.9

44.5

37.3

4o.8

6.6

2.9

2.8

2.3

2.8

5.8

2.7

1.5

3.2

Japan

Canada

France

Labor input

2.8

1.5

o.4

Manhour s

2.2

1.5

Improvem ent in Composi tiona

o.6

Average Share to Labor
Capital Input

Average Share to Capital
Total Capital and Labor Inputb

Germany

Capital

4.9

2.0

0.2

-0.5

0.7

3.2

0.2

o.o

1.5

Labor

1.6

0.8

2.6

2.8

2.1

2.7

2.6

1.5

1.7

11.0

5.1

5.9

5.2

4.8

9.8

5.1

4.o

4.5

Total Factor Product ivity

4.4

2.3

3.1

2.9

1.9

4.o

2.4

2.5

1.3

Share Output due to Total
Factor Product ivity

40.2

44.2

51.9

55.6·

40.7

41.2

46.6

62.2

29.2

Output

C

Notes:

a"Improv ement in composi tion" is referred . to in the source as increase in the q_uality
of labor and capital
respect ively; it reflects the differen ce between aggrega te capital and labor measure
s and disaggre gated
measure s which take into account differen t labor skills and differen t capital
service flows, and changes
in the relative share of subcate gories in the aggrega te.

b

C

Source:

""'

Capital and labor inputs are weighte d by their relative shares in output.
Output= gross private domestic product .
Laurits R. Christen sen, Dianne Cummings, and Dale W. Jorgenso n, "An Interna tional
Compari son of Growth in
Product ivity, 1947-1973," NBER Conferen ce on New Developm ents in Product ivity
Measure ment, Nov. 13-14, 1975,

,,.,..,,.__,,,, h.
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Appendix
Table 4 .

Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson Estimates of Average Annual Rates of Growth of Manhour
Productivity and Its Sources, 1960-1973
{in eercent}
Japan

Canada

France

Germany

Italy

Korea

Netherlands

United
Kingdom

United
States

Manhour Productivity

8.9

3.6

5.9

6.3

5.8

6.o

5-3

4.6

2.8

Capital per Worker

6.3

2.4

5.4

7.4

6.1

2.0

4.8

3.9

1.2

Capital/worker

29.3

29.8

38.0

47.7

39.7

12.5

39.7

32.0

17.7

Improvement in Capital
Composition

15.4

7-7

5.7.

2.9

2.7

8.6

10.5

5.9

17.6

3-7

0.7

4.2

0.9

24.7

12.6

5.2

8.2

17.8

49.2

61.9

51.9

46.6

33.2

67.3

44.6

54.2

47.0

Percentage Attributable to:

Improvement in Labor
Composition
Total Factor Productivity

Note:

I

Percentages in final four rows may not add to 100 due to rounding errors.

Sources:

From Table 9 in source cited in Table 3.
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